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Abstract
We study a model of group identification in which individuals’ opinions as to the
membership of a group are aggregated to form a list of the group’s members. Potential
aggregation rules are studied through the axiomatic approach. We introduce two axioms,
meet separability and join separability, each of which requires the list of members gener-
ated by the aggregation rule to be independent of whether the question of membership in
a group is separated into questions of membership in two other groups. We use these ax-
ioms to characterize a class of “one vote” rules, in which one opinion determines whether
an individual is considered to be a member of a group. We then use this characterization
to provide new axiomatizations of the liberal rule, in which each individual determines
for himself whether he is a member of the group, as the only non-degenerate anonymous
rule satisfying the meet separability and join separability axioms.
JEL classification numbers: D70, D71, D72
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Separation of Decisions in Group Identification∗
Alan D. Miller
1 Introduction
We study a model of group identification first introduced by Kasher and Rubinstein
[6], in which individuals’ opinions as to the membership of a group are aggregated to
form a list of the group’s members. Potential aggregation rules are studied through the
axiomatic approach. Various axioms are proposed and characterizations of the classes of
rules satisfying these axioms are provided.1
Instead of asking the question “who is a member of a group” we might pose multiple
questions each asking whether a particular individual is a member of the group. The
decision to study the larger problem of group identification in place of the smaller prob-
lems about the status of particular individuals requires some justification. There are two
main reasons why we might prefer to study the simultaneous approach.
First, we might view certain voters as being linked to certain issues. In the group
identification model there is a linkage between each voter and the issue which determines
whether that individual is a member. By aggregating the opinions simultaneously we
are able to preserve this linkage. Second, we might also believe that these issues are
connected – that the question of whether one person is a member of a group is related
to the question of whether a different person is a member of that group.
∗Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences, Mail Code 228-77, California Institute of Technology,
Pasadena, CA 91125. Email: alan@hss.caltech.edu. Website: http://www.hss.caltech.edu/∼alan. Spe-
cial thanks to Christopher P. Chambers and Dov Samet for their advice and encouragement while writing
this paper. Helpful comments were also provided by Ken Binmore, Kim Border, Federico Echenique,
Jon X Eguia, Philip T. Hoffman, Matias Iaryczower, R. Preston McAfee, Stuart McDonald, Kateryna
Sydorova, Oscar Volij, Eyal Winter, Andriy Zapechelnyuk, and seminar participants at the California
Institute of Technology and at the Second Israeli Game Theory Conference in Honor of Professor Yisrael
Aumann. All errors are my own.
1The Kasher-Rubinstein framework is applicable in studying questions that ask which individuals
meet a particular standard, such as “who is an American?” or “who is an honors student?” A related
but conceptually distinct problem involves ranking individuals according to a standard. For example, we
might want to compare students. The latter problem has been studied axiomatically by Palacios-Huerta
and Volij [7] in the context of developing a cardinal ranking of scientific publications. In these papers
standards are all taken exogenously. For a very different approach which uses preferences of agents to
models standards endogenously see Sobel [9].
The literature which has studied the Kasher-Rubinstein group identification model
has generally studied the assumption that these issues are not connected. The stronger
version of the independence axiom used in these papers, found in Kasher and Rubinstein
[6], Samet and Schmeidler [8], Ju [5], and C¸engelci and Sanver [3], requires that whether
a particular individual is determined to be a member of a group is independent of the
opinions regarding all of the other individuals. A weaker notion of independence is found
in Kasher and Rubinstein [6], Sung and Dimitrov [10], and Dimitrov, Sung, and Xu [4],
the last of which characterizes a recursive procedure for determining group membership.2
We depart from the independence axiom in this paper. Instead we focus our attention
on a set of axioms we term separability. Suppose we can determine whether an individual
is a member of a particular group merely from knowing whether she is a member of two
other groups. Separability requires that the list of members of the former group is inde-
pendent of whether the list is generated directly from aggregating the opinions regarding
the membership of the former group or indirectly from aggregating the opinions regard-
ing the membership of the two latter groups. In particular we discuss two such axioms,
meet separability and join separability, which we illustrate here with two examples.
Suppose we wish to know who is an officer and a gentleman. One approach would
be to gather the opinions as to who are officer-gentlemen and aggregate those opinions
to form a list. An alternative approach would be to gather two sets of opinions: one
with respect to the identity of the officers and one with respect to the identity of the
gentlemen, aggregate them both separately to form lists of officers and gentlemen, and
then take the names common to both lists. Meet separability requires that the same list
of officer-gentlemen is generated regardless of which of these two approaches is used.
Alternatively, suppose we wish to know who is an Iberian.3 One approach would be
to gather the opinions as to who are Iberians and aggregate those opinions to form a
list. Another approach would be to gather two sets of opinions: one with respect to the
identity of the Spanish and one with respect to the identity of the Portuguese, aggregate
them both separately to form lists of Spanish and Portuguese, and then take the names
on either (or both) of the lists. Join separability requires that the same list of Iberians
is generated regardless of which of these approaches is used.
These axioms do not require neutrality – that the method by which the opinions are
aggregated should be independent of the subject matter of the opinions. Abstractly we
might allow the use of a different method to aggregate opinions about the Spanish than
we would use to aggregate opinions about the Portuguese, and we might use an even
different method to aggregate opinions about Iberians. We seek to characterize the full
class of non-degenerate aggregation methods such that these separability properties can
be achieved. The assumption of non-degeneracy, however, implies that the aggregation
2The assumption of independence is not made by Billot [2] who, while motivated by Kasher and
Rubinstein [6] and Samet and Schmeidler [8], studies a very different model in which group membership
is determined by the individuals’ preferences.
3That is, who is either Spanish or Portuguese.
2
method must be neutral. It is impossible to generate a list of Iberians which is indepen-
dent of whether the question is separated into two unless the same aggregation rule is
used to aggregate opinions about the Spanish, Portuguese, and Iberians, or unless the
opinions are completely irrelevant in determining whether some individuals are Iberian.
Using the concepts of meet separability and join separability we characterize three
classes of non-degenerate rules. The first such class is the set of non-degenerate rules
satisfying the meet separability axiom, which we term agreement rules. In an agreement
rule, for each individual there is a set of opinions such that the individual is determined
to be a member of the group if and only if each of those opinions is favorable. There is no
requirement that the opinions relate directly to the individual in question. Thus, if we
consider a society composed of three individuals, Alice, Bob, and Charlie, one agreement
rule determines Alice to be a member if and only if everyone considers Alice to be a
member, while another rule determines Alice to be a member if and only if Bob and
Charlie consider each other to be members. We use the term “agreement” rules because
a certain set of opinions need to be in agreement (and favorable) for an individual to be
qualified.4
The second such class is the set of non-degenerate rules satisfying the join separability
axiom, which we term nomination rules. In a nomination rule, for each individual there
is a set of opinions such that the individual is determined to be a member of the group if
and only if one or more of those opinions is favorable. There is no requirement that the
opinions relate directly to the individual in question. Thus, in our three person society,
one nomination rule determines Alice to be a member if and only if someone considers
Alice to be a member, while another rule determines Alice to be a member if and only if
Bob considers Charlie to be a member, Charlie considers Bob to be a member, or both.
We use the term “nomination” rules because only one opinion out of a set needs to be
favorable for an individual to be qualified. This is akin to a nomination process in which
any one member of a group can decide to nominate.
The third class of rules we characterize is the set of non-degenerate rules satisfying
the meet separability and join separability axioms, which we term one vote rules. In a
one vote rule, for each individual there is exactly one opinion which determines whether
the individual is a member of a group. Again there is no requirement that the opinion
be directly related to the individual in question. According to one rule Alice chooses
whether she is a member; according to another Alice is determined to be a member if
and only if Bob considers Charlie to be a member.
As a consequence, no rules in which two or more opinions are relevant in determining
whether an individual is a member of a group satisfy both the meet separability and join
separability axioms. These include the consent rules introduced by Samet and Schmeidler
[8] (except for the cases of the liberal rule5 and the degenerate rules), quota rules (in
which an individual is qualified if a certain positive number of people consider him to be
4By “qualified” we mean determined to be a member of the group.
5Under the liberal rule each individual chooses whether that individual is qualified.
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a member) and oligarchic rules (in which a set of (at least two) individuals determine
who is a member).
A potentially desirable property which we might want an aggregation rule to satisfy
is self-duality, first introduced by Aumann and Maschler [1] in the context of claims in
bankruptcy. In the claims literature, two rules are dual if one allocates losses to the
claimants in the same manner that the other rule allocates gains. A rule is self-dual if it
allocates losses in the same way that it allocates gains.
The concept of self-duality was introduced to the group identification literature by
Samet and Schmeidler [8], who defined two rules as dual if one aggregates opinions
about a group’s members in the same manner that the other aggregates opinions about
a group’s non-members. Likewise, Samet and Schmeidler defined a rule as self-dual if it
aggregates opinions about a group’s members in the same manner that the rule aggregates
opinions about a group’s non-members. Extending this notion to our context, we find
that agreement rules and nomination rules are dual and, as a consequence, any self-dual
rule satisfying either of the separability axioms must be a one-vote rule.
Several of the rules previously discussed in the literature do satisfy the two separa-
bility axioms. These include the liberal rule and the dictatorship, both first introduced
by Kasher and Rubinstein [6]. The liberal rule has been widely studied, including a
refinement of the Kasher and Rubinstein characterization by Sung and Dimitrov [10]
and a separate axiomatization by Samet and Schmeidler [8]. We provide two separate
axiomatizations of the liberal rule based off of our characterization of one-vote rules.
2 The Model
2.1 The model and the notation
We extend the model introduced by Kasher and Rubinstein [6] and use the notation
introduced by Samet and Schmeidler [8]. There is a set N ≡ {1, ..., n} of individuals,
n ≥ 3. There is a given Boolean algebra of issues B.6 Each element b ∈ B is an issue
pertaining to membership in a group.7
The individuals each mark their opinions about the groups on ballots. A ballot can
be represented as an 1 × n row vector Pi ∈ {0, 1}N . The n ballots can be assembled
into an n × n matrix P ∈ {0, 1}N×N , where Pij = 1 if individual i considers individual
j to be a member, and where Pij = 0 if individual i does not consider individual j to
6A Boolean algebra is a set of sets closed under intersection, union, and complementation, where for
any two issues a, b ∈ B, a ∧ b is the intersection of these issues (“a and b”), a ∨ b is the union of these
issues (“a and/or b”), and a¯ and b¯ are the complements of these issues (“not a” and “not b”).
7For example, if a is the issue of being American and b is the issue of being British, then a ∧ b is the
issue of being American and British, and a∨ b is the issue of being American or British (or both). Also,
a¯ is the issue of being non-American, and b¯ is the issue of being non-British.
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be a member. Such a matrix P is called a profile. A qualification problem is a pair
(P, b) ∈ {0, 1}N×N ×B. A social rule is a mapping f : {0, 1}N×N ×B→ {0, 1}N which
maps each qualification problem into a unique vector f(P, b) ≡ (f1(P, b), ..., fn(P, b)),
where fj(P, b) = 1 if and only if individual j is determined to be a member of group b.
For any two matrices or vectors A and B, we define A ∧ B to be the coordinatewise
minimum, so that (A ∧ B)ij = min{(A)ij, (B)ij}, and we define A ∨ B to be the coordi-
natewise maximum, so that (A ∨B)ij = max{(A)ij, (B)ij}. For any two pairs (P, b) and
(Q, a) we let (P, b) ∧ (Q, a) ≡ (P ∧ Q, b ∧ a) and (P, b) ∨ (Q, a) ≡ (P ∨ Q, b ∨ a). For
x ∈ {0, 1} we define x¯ ≡ 1− x.
We let 1 and 0 refer to the n × n matrices composed entirely of ones and zeros,
respectively. For any two matrices or vectors S and T , we say that S ≥ T if this inequality
holds coordinatewise, and S  T if that inequality does not hold coordinatewise. We say
that S > T if S 6= T and S ≥ T .
Individuals in the model give their opinions consistently. If profiles P and Q describe
the opinions about issues a and b, respectively, then P∧Q and P∨Q describe the opinions
about issues a∧ b and a∨ b, respectively. Similarly, P¯ and Q¯ would be the profiles which
describe opinions about issues a¯ and b¯, respectively.
2.2 The axioms
Consider the following problem. Within the senior class of a small college there is a
group of students who are smart, and there is a group of students who are hard-working.
The board of trustees is having its annual meeting, and the administration would like
to invite the smart hard-working seniors to have dinner with the trustees. While the
seniors form a well defined group in this college, the administrators do not know which
of the students are smart and which of the students are hard working. A severe problem
of grade inflation has left the college without any reliable metric. The college president
believes that only the students have this information.
A decision is made to gather this information from the students. But a debate quickly
ensues as to the method. One administrator argues that every senior should be given
a ballot and asked to mark off the names of the smart hard-working seniors. Another
administrator argues that the seniors should be given two ballots – one of the smart
seniors and another of those who are hard-working. Proponents of the one-ballot method
argue that their approach is less costly while supporters of the two ballot method argue
that their approach generates data that might be useful later. However, neither side can
make a clear case as to why their approach will generate better results. As a result the
president declares that the first method will be used (because it is cheaper), but that the
final list of smart hard-working seniors must be the same regardless of which method is
used.
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In this case s ∈ B is the issue of being smart, h ∈ B is the issue of being hard-
working, and s ∧ h ∈ B is the issue of being smart and hardworking. The information
from the ballots will be assembled into profiles. If the students are given a single ballot
there will be one profile, which we will denote R, which contains the seniors’ opinions
about the smart hard-working seniors. The administrators will then aggregate the data
to generate a list of the smart hard-working seniors, denoted f(R, s ∧ h).
If the students are given two ballots there will be two profiles: S, which contains the
students’ opinions about the smart seniors, and H, which contains the students’ opinions
about the hard-working seniors. The administrators will then aggregate the opinions
about the smart seniors to create a list, denoted f(S, s). They will also aggregate the
opinions about the hard-working seniors to create a list, denotedf(H, h). Afterward they
will generate a list of smart hard-working seniors simply by taking the names common
to both lists. This is the meet of the two lists: f(S, s) ∧ f(H, h).8
The students at the college are reasonably intelligent, and as a result the administra-
tors are confident that the information on the ballots will be given consistently regardless
of which method is used. A student would put another student’s name on the ballot of
smart hard-working seniors if and only if he would have put her name on both the ballot
of smart seniors and on the ballot of hard-working seniors. This means that the profile
of opinions about smart hard-working seniors (R) must be the same as the meet of the
profile of opinions about smart seniors (S) and the profile of opinions about hard-working
seniors (H), or R = S ∧H.9 Therefore the list of smart hard-working seniors generated
through the one ballot method is f(H ∧ S, h ∧ s), or f((H, h) ∧ (S, s)).
The president of the college has required that the final list of smart hard-working
seniors must be the same regardless of which method is used. Therefore the social rule
must satisfy the equality f((H, h) ∧ (S, s)) = f(H, h) ∧ f(S, s). Our first axiom, meet
separability, requires that this be the case.
Axiom 1 Meet separability: A social rule f satisfies meet separability if, for every pair
of issues {a, b} ⊂ B and for all profiles P and Q, f((P, a) ∧ (Q, b)) = f(P, a) ∧ f(Q, b).
In the town in which the college is situated there are two gangs: the Darwins and the
Bryans. A researcher wants to know who in the town is a member of a gang. Fortunately
for the researcher, gang membership is not illegal and members are proud to reveal their
affiliations. Unfortunately for the researcher, the members may be too proud. The gangs
are fragmented into loosely affiliated “dens”, and there is no clear agreement as to who
all of the gang members are. The researcher plans to do an extensive survey of all the
towns’ residents to get the needed data on who is a member of a gang.
The researcher can design the survey in either of two methods. The survey can have
two questions, asking for a list of Darwins and a list of Bryans, respectively, or it can
8This is true because, fj(S, s) ∧ fj(H,h) = 1 if and only if hj(S, s) = 1 and fj(H,h) = 1.
9This is true because (H ∧ S)ij = 1 if and only if Hij = 1 and Sij = 1.
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have one question, asking for a list of gang members. The researcher needs to justify her
methodology but cannot elucidate a clear reason as to one method should be preferred
over the other. Furthermore, she wants to make sure that her study will be comparable
to work done by later researchers who may not have the same choice. As a result she
chooses the single question survey (to save on costs) but decides that the ultimate list of
gang members should be independent of which method is used.
In this case, d ∈ B is the issue of being a Darwin, b ∈ B is the issue of being a Bryan,
and d∨b ∈ B is the issue of being a gang member. The two question survey will generate
two profiles of opinions: D, which contains the views of the townspeople about the
Darwins, and B, which contains the views of the townspeople about the Bryans. Each of
these profiles will be aggregated to generate a list: f(D, d), a list of Darwins, and f(B, b),
a list of Bryans. The list of gang members is the join of these lists, f(D, d) ∨ f(B, b).10
The one question survey, on the other hand, will generate a single profile of opinions,
D ∨B, which contains the views of the townspeople regarding the gang members.11 The
opinions in the profile will be aggregated to form a list of gang members, f(D∨B, d∨ b),
or f((D, d) ∨ (B, b)).
The constrain imposed by the researcher is that the ultimate list of gang members
should be independent of which method is used. Therefore the social rule must satisfy
the equality f((D, d)∨ f(B, b)) = f(D, d)∨ f(B, b). Our second axiom, join separability,
requires that this be the case.
Axiom 2 Join separability: A social rule f satisfies join separability if for every pair of
issues {a, b} ⊂ B and for all profiles P and Q, f((P, a) ∨ (Q, b)) = f(P, a) ∨ f(Q, b).
Our third axiom is adapted from Samet and Schmeidler [8]. This axiom excludes
constant rules; rules for which there exists an individual who is, or is not, a member of
the group regardless of which names are on the ballots.
Axiom 3 Non-degeneracy: For every individual j and every issue b ∈ B there exist
profiles P and P ′ such that fj(P, b) = 1 and fj(P ′, b) = 0.
The separability axioms do not require that the social rule must use the same method
to aggregate opinions about different issues. We might use one method to aggregate opin-
ions as to the group of officers, a different method to aggregate opinions as to gentlemen,
and a third method to aggregate opinions as to officer-gentlemen. If the social rule is
non-degenerate, however, then the separability axioms imply that the method by which
opinions are aggregated must be independent of the issue. We prove this in the following
theorem.
10This is true because, fj(D, d) ∨ fj(B, b) = 1 if and only if fj(D, d) = 1, fj(B, b) = 1, or both.
11This is true because (D ∨B)ij = 1 if and only if Dij = 1, Bij = 1, or both.
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Theorem 2.1 (i) If a social rule f satisfies non-degeneracy and meet separability then,
for all issues a, b ∈ B and for every profile P, f(P, a) = f(P, b).
(ii) If a social rule f satisfies non-degeneracy and join separability then,
for all issues a, b ∈ B and for every profile P, f(P, a) = f(P, b).
Proof : We prove (i). The proof of (ii) is similar. Let {a, b} ∈ B. By meet separability,
for all profiles P and Q, f((P, a) ∧ (Q, b)) = f(P, a) ∧ f(Q, b). We know that f((P, a) ∧
(Q, b)) = f(P ∧ Q, a ∧ b), and that f(P ∧ Q, a ∧ b) = f(Q ∧ P, a ∧ b), and therefore
f((P, a)∧ (Q, b)) = f((Q, a)∧ (P, b)). It follows that f(P, a)∧f(Q, b) = f(Q, a)∧f(P, b).
Let j ∈ N . By non-degeneracy there must exist profiles Rj and Sj such that
fj(R
j, a) = fj(S
j, b) = 1. Let Qj ≡ Rj ∧ Sj. It follows that fj((Rj, a) ∧ (Sj, b)) = 1 and
consequently fj(R
j∧Sj, a∧b) = fj(Qj, a∧b) = fj(Qj∧Qj, a∧b) = fj((Qj, a)∧(Qj, b)) = 1.
Therefore it must be that fj(Q
j, a) = fj(Q
j, b) = 1.
Let P ∈ {0, 1}N×N . Because fj(Qj, a) = 1 it follows that fj(Qj, a)∧fj(P, b) = fj(P, b).
Likewise, because fj(Q
j, b) = 1 it follows that fj(P, a) ∧ fj(Qj, b) = fj(P, a). We know
that fj(Q
j, a) ∧ fj(P, b) = fj(P, a) ∧ fj(Qj, b) and therefore, fj(P, b) = fj(P, a).
It follows that for all profiles P , fj(P, a ∧ b) = fj(P ∧ P, a ∧ b) = fj((P, a) ∧ (P, b)) =
fj(P, a) ∧ fj(P, b) = fj(P, a) ∧ fj(P, a) = fj(P, a), and therefore fj(P, a) = fj(P, b) =
fj(P, a∧ b). Because this is true for an arbitrary j ∈ N and an arbitrary pair {a, b} ⊂ B,
f(P, a) = f(P, b) = f(P, a ∧ b). It follows that for all a, b ∈ B, f(P, a) = f(P, b).
Our last axiom, also adapted from Samet and Schmeidler [8], requires that as addi-
tional names are added to the ballots, no names are removed from the list of qualified
persons.
Axiom 4 Monotonicity: For all profiles P and P ′ such that P ≥ P ′, f(P, b) ≥ f(P ′, b).
The monotonicity axiom is implied by either of the meet separability and join sepa-
rability axioms, as we demonstrate in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.2 If a social rule f satisfies either of the meet separability or join separability
axioms then it satisfies the monotonicity axiom.
2.3 Agreement Rules
The first class of social rules we characterize are agreement rules, in which for every
individual there is a set of votes which “matter” such that the individual is qualified if
and only if each and every one of those votes is in the affirmative. Then the minimal
profile under which the individual is qualified is the profile such that all of the votes
which matter are in the affirmative and the others are against.
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Social Rule 1 Agreement rules: For all individuals j there exists a profile P j− > 0 such
that, for all issues b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = 1 if and only if P ≥ P j−.
We characterize these rules in the following theorem:
Theorem 2.3 A social rule f satisfies the meet separability and non-degeneracy axioms
if and only if it is an agreement rule.
Proof : Let {a, b} ⊂ B and P,Q ∈ {0, 1}N×N . By the definition of meet separability,
f((P, a)∧ (Q, b)) = f(P ∧Q, a∧ b) = f(P, a)∧ f(Q, b). It follows from Theorem 2.1 that
f(P, a) = f(P, b) = f(P, a ∧ b) and therefore f(P ∧Q, b) = f(P, b) ∧ f(Q, b).
Let j ∈ N . Define Pj ≡ {P ∈ {0, 1}N×N : fj(P, b) = 1}. We know that Pj 6= ∅
because if Pj = ∅ then fj(P, b) = 0 for all profiles P , and this would contradict the
non-degeneracy axiom.
Define P j− =
∧
P∈Pj
P . For all profiles P ′, P ′′ ∈ Pj, fj(P ′, b) = fj(P ′′, b) = 1. By the
meet separability axiom, fj(P
′ ∧ P ′′, b) = 1. It follows by an induction argument that
fj(
∧
P∈Pj
P, b) = fj(P
j−, b) = 1. Therefore, P j− ∈ Pj.
Clearly, for all profiles P ∈ Pj, P ≥
∧
P∈Pj
P = P j−. Furthermore, P j− 6= 0, otherwise
fj(P, b) = 1 for all profiles P , which would violate the non-degeneracy axiom.
Lastly, we show that for all profiles P such that P ≥ P j−, P ∈ Pj. This follows
from Lemma 2.2: P ≥ P j− implies that fj(P, b) ≥ fj(P j−, b) = 1, which implies that
fj(P, b) = 1. Hence P ∈ Pj if and only if P ≥ P j−. Therefore, for all issues b ∈ B,
fj(P, b) = 1 if and only if P ≥ P j−.
2.4 Nomination Rules
The second class of social rules we characterize are nomination rules, in which for every
individual there is a set of votes which matter such that the individual is qualified if and
only if any one (or more) of those votes is in the affirmative. Then the maximal profile
under which the individual is not qualified is the profile such that all of the votes which
matter are against and the others are in the affirmative.
Social Rule 2 Nomination rules: For all individuals j there exists a profile P j+ < 1
such that, for all issues b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = 0 if and only if P ≤ P j+.
We characterize these rules in the following theorem:
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Theorem 2.4 A social rule f satisfies the join separability and non-degeneracy axioms
if and only if it is an nomination rule on B.
Proof : Let {a, b} ⊂ B and P,Q ∈ {0, 1}N×N . By the definition of join separability,
f((P, a)∨ (Q, b)) = f(P ∨Q, a∨ b) = f(P, a)∨ f(Q, b). It follows from Theorem 2.1 that
f(P, a) = f(P, b) = f(P, a ∨ b) and therefore f(P ∨Q, b) = f(P, b) ∨ f(Q, b).
Let j ∈ N be arbitrary. Define Pj ≡ {P ∈ {0, 1}N×N : fj(P, b) = 0}. We know that
Pj 6= ∅ because if Pj = ∅ then fj(P, b) = 1 for all profiles P , and this would contradict
the non-degeneracy axiom.
Define P j+ =
∨
P∈Pj
P . For all profiles P ′, P ′′ ∈ Pj, fj(P ′, b) = fj(P ′′, b) = 0. By the
join separability axiom, fj(P
′ ∨ P ′′, b) = 0. It follows by an induction argument that
fj(
∨
P∈Pj
P, b) = fj(P
j+, b) = 0. Therefore, P j+ ∈ Pj.
Clearly, for all profiles P ∈ Pj, P ≤
∨
P∈Pj
P = P j+. Furthermore, P j+ 6= 1, otherwise
fj(P, b) = 0 for all profiles P , which would violate the non-degeneracy axiom.
Lastly, we show that for all profiles P such that P ≤ P j+, P ∈ Pj. This follows
from Lemma 2.2: P ≤ P j+ implies that fj(P, b) ≤ fj(P j+, b) = 0, which implies that
fj(P, b) = 0. Hence P ∈ Pj if and only if P ≤ P j+. Therefore, for all issues b ∈ B,
fj(P, b) = 0 if and only if P ≤ P j−.
2.5 One-Vote Rules
We now characterize the set of social rules which are both agreement rules and nomination
rules. These are the rules in which for every individual there is one vote which matters
such that the individual is qualified if and only if that vote is in the affirmative.
Social Rule 3 One-vote rules: For all individuals j there exists (i, k) in N × N such
that, for all issues b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = Pik.
From this follows our main result:
Theorem 2.5 A social rule f satisfies the meet separability, join separability, and non-
degeneracy axioms if and only if it is a one-vote rule.
Proof : That the one-vote rules satisfy the three axioms is trivial. We show that any
social rule that satisfies the three axioms is necessarily a one-vote rule. Suppose a social
rule f satisfies the meet separability, join separability, and non-degeneracy axioms. Let
j ∈ N and let b ∈ B. Because f satisfies meet separability and non-degeneracy it must
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be an agreement rule (by Theorem 2.3). Therefore, there must exist a profile P j− > 0
such that fj(P, b) = 1 if and only if P ≥ P j−. This implies that there exists (i, k)
in N × N such that fj(P, b) = 0 if Pik = 0 and therefore fj(P, b) ≤ Pik. Because f
satisfies join separability and non-degeneracy it must be an agreement rule (by Theorem
2.4). Therefore, there must exist a profile P j+ < 1 such that fj(P, b) = 0 if and only
if P ≤ P j+. This implies that P j+ik = 0, which implies that fj(P, b) = 1 if Pik = 1 and
therefore fj(P, b) ≥ Pik. It follows that fj(P, b) = Pik. By Theorem 2.1 it follows that
f(P, b) = Pik for every issue b ∈ B.
2.6 Parition and Duality
Individuals in the model vote consistently: if P is the profile describing opinions about
group b, then P¯ is the profile describing opinions about the group b¯. Then f(P, b) is the list
of individuals determined to be members of group b and f(P¯ , b¯) is the list of individuals
determined to be members of group b¯. A logical requirement for the social rule is that
these lists form a partition of N; that is, f(P, a)∧f(P¯ , a¯) = 0 and f(P, a)∨f(P¯ , a¯) = 1.12
For every individual j ∈ N , fj(P, b) 6= fj(P¯ , b¯), and therefore f(P, a) = f(P¯ , a¯). Our
next axiom, partition, requires that this be the case.
Axiom 5 Partition: A social rule f satisfies partition if f(P, b) = f(P¯ , b¯) for all profiles
P and all issues b ∈ B.
A concept related to partition is duality, first introduced in the context of group
identification by Samet and Schmeidler [8]. Suppose we wish to know who is a non-
member of b. The profile describing the opinions about the non-members of b is P¯ . Thus
f(P¯ , b) gives us the list of people considered to be non-members of b by the aggregation
rule used to determine membership in b, and f(P¯ , b) gives us a list of people who are not
non-members of b. We denote this rule by f¯(P, b) = f(P¯ , b) and call f¯ the dual of f . If
f = f¯ we say that f is self-dual.
Axiom 6 Self-duality (Samet-Schmeidler): A social rule f satisfies self-duality if f = f¯ .
Partition and self-duality are very different concepts. However, in the presence of
non-degeneracy and either separability axiom, the partition and self-duality axioms are
equivalent.
Proposition 2.6 If a social rule f satisfies non-degeneracy and either meet separability
or join separability then the following two statements are equivalent:
(i) f satisfies partition,
(ii) f satisfies self-duality.
12Here 0 and 1 refer to 1× n vectors of zeros and ones, respectively, and not to matrices.
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Proof : By Theorem 2.1, for all a, b ∈ B, f(P, a) = f(P, b). Because B is closed under
complementation it follows that f(P, b) = f(P, b¯), and therefore f(P¯ , b¯) = f(P¯ , b).
We also use a notion of duality of axioms which we take from Thomson [11], who
discusses related issues in a claims context. We say that two axioms are the dual of
each other if whenever a social rule f satisfies one axiom, f¯ satisfies the other. We use
this notion to establish the following proposition.
Proposition 2.7 The meet separability and join separability axioms are dual of each
other.
Proof : Let a, b ∈ B and let P,Q ∈ {0, 1}N×N . Let f satisfy the meet separability axiom.
Then f((P¯ , a) ∧ (Q¯, b)) = f(P¯ ∧ Q¯, a ∧ b) = f(P¯ , a) ∧ f(Q¯, b). It follows from Theorem
2.1 that f(P¯ ∧ Q¯, b) = f(P¯ , b) ∧ f(Q¯, b), and therefore f(P¯ ∧ Q¯, b) = f(P¯ , b) ∧ f(Q¯, b).
By DeMorgan’s laws, f(P¯ ∧ Q¯, b) = f(P ∨Q, b) = f¯(P ∨ Q, b). Also by DeMorgan’s
laws, f(P¯ , b) ∧ f(Q¯, b) = f(P¯ , b) ∨ f(Q¯, b) = f¯(P, b) ∨ f¯(Q, b). Therefore, f¯(P ∨Q, b) =
f¯(P, b) ∨ f¯(Q, b). By Theorem 2.1 it follows that f¯(P ∨ Q, a ∨ b) = f¯((P, a) ∨ (Q, b)) =
f¯(P, b)∨ f¯(Q, b). This shows that if a social rule f satisfies the meet separability axiom,
its dual f¯ satisfies the join separability axiom. The second half of the proof is symmetric
to the first.
The following corollary to the proposition follows directly from Theorems 2.3 and 2.4.
Corollary 2.8 The dual of an agreement rule is a nomination rule.
We note that self-duality implies non-degeneracy.
Lemma 2.9 If a social rule f satisfies the self-duality axiom then it satisfies the non-
degeneracy axiom.
Second, we establish the following relationships between the meet separability, join
separability, and self-duality axioms.
Proposition 2.10 If a social rule f satisfies the meet separability and self-duality axioms
then it satisfies join separability and non-degeneracy. If a social rule f satisfies the join
separability and self-duality axioms then satisfies meet separability and self-duality.
Proof : By Lemma 2.9, any social rule that satisfies the self-duality axiom also satisfies
non-degeneracy. By Proposition 2.7, meet separability and join separability are the dual
of each other. Therefore any social rule that satisfies self-duality and meet separability
must also satisfy join separability and non-degeneracy. Similarly, any social rule that
satisfies self-duality and join separability must also satisfy meet separability and non-
degeneracy.
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Proposition 2.11 If a social rule f satisfies the meet separability, join separability and
non-degeneracy axioms then it satisfies self-duality axiom.
Proof : Let a social rule f satisfy meet separability, join separability and non-degeneracy.
Let j ∈ N , P ∈ {0, 1}N×N , and b ∈ B. By Theorem 2.5 f must be a one-vote rule ,
and therefore there exists a pair (i, k) ∈ N ×N such that fj(P, b) = Pik. It follows that
fj(P¯ , b) = P¯ik and thus fj(P¯ , b) = P¯ ik = Pik. Therefore, for every issue b ∈ B and every
profile P , f(P, b) = f(P¯ , b).
3 Discussion
3.1 The Liberal Rule and Dictatorship
Kasher and Rubinstein [6] provided axiomatizations for two types of social rules: the
liberal rule and the dictatorship.13
Under the liberal rule, each individual decides for herself whether she is qualified.
Social Rule 4 Liberal rule: For every j ∈ N and for every issue b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = Pjj.
Under a dictatorship, a pre-designated individual decides who is qualified.
Social Rule 5 Dictatorship: There exists an i ∈ N such that for every j ∈ N and every
b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = Pij.
Each of these rules is a one-vote rule and consequently satisfies the two separability
axioms as well as the non-degeneracy axiom.
Of these rules, the liberal rule has received the more extensive treatment in the
literature, including a refinement of the Kasher-Rubinstein axiomatization by Sung and
Dimitrov [10] and a separate axiomatization by Samet and Schmeidler [8]. We provide a
separate axiomatization of the liberal rule as the only social rule which satisfies the two
separability axioms as well as particular concepts of symmetry and non-degeneracy.
Kasher and Rubinstein [6] and Samet and Schmeidler [8] provided two different con-
cepts of symmetry. The symmetry condition used by Kasher and Rubinstein requires
that if any two individuals are symmetric with respect to their views about others and
others’ views toward them, then either both or neither are qualified.
13Kasher and Rubinstein also provide an axiomatization for a third class of social rules, the oligarchic
rules; however, these rules rely on a model substantially different from that discussed in this paper.
While the Kasher and Rubinstein axiomatization of the dictatorship uses a slightly different model as
well, it is nonetheless similar enough to be understood in our framework. The term “liberal rule” is
taken from Samet and Schmeidler. Kasher and Rubinstein call this rule the “strong liberal collective
identity function”.
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Axiom 7 Symmetry: Let j, k ∈ N . If (a) Pjj = Pkk, (b) Pkj = Pjk, and, for all
i ∈ N \ {j, k}, (c) Pij = Pik, and (d) Pji = Pki, then, for every issue b ∈ B, fj(P, b) =
fk(P, b).
The symmetry condition used by Samet and Schmeidler [8], which we term anonymity
(to minimize confusion), requires that the list of the qualified individuals does not de-
pend on their names. We switch names through a permutation pi of N . Thus, for a
given permutation pi, i is the new name of the individual formerly known as pi(i). For
a given profile P ∈ {0, 1} we let piP be the profile in which the names are switched.
Then (piP )ij = Ppi(i)pi(j). We denote pif(P, b) ≡ (fpi(1)(P, b), fpi(2)(P, b), ..., fpi(n)(P, b)).
Anonymity requires that if individual i is qualified in profile piP , then individual pi(i) is
qualified in profile P .
Axiom 8 Anonymity (Samet-Schmeidler): For every permutation pi of N and every
issue b ∈ B, f(piP, b) = pif(P, b).
We show that the liberal rule is the only one-vote rule which satisfies the anonymity
axiom.
Theorem 3.1 The liberal rule is the only rule that satisfies the meet separability, join
separability, non-degeneracy, and anonymity axioms.
Proof : That the liberal rule satisfies the four axioms is trivial. We show that any rule
that satisfies the four axioms must necessarily be a one-vote rule. Let j ∈ N and let
b ∈ B. Let f satisfy separability, join separability, non-degeneracy, and anonymity. By
Theorem 2.5 f must be a one vote rule, and therefore there must be a pair of individuals
i and k such that fj(P, b) = Pik. Because the pair of individuals may differ for every
individual j, we denote these individuals i(j) and k(j). Therefore, fj(P, b) = Pi(j)k(j). Let
pi be a permutation of N . Then, fj(piP, b) = (piP )i(j)k(j) = Ppi(i(j))pi(k(j)), and fpi((j))(P, b) =
Pi(pi(j))k(pi(j)). By the anonymity axiom, it follows that Ppi(i(j))pi(k(j)) = Pi(pi(j))k(pi(j)), which
implies that pi(i(j)) = i(pi(j)) and pi(k(j)) = k(pi(j)), which hold if and only if i(j) = j
and k(j) = j. Thus, for every individual j ∈ N and every issue b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = Pjj.
From Propositions 2.10 and 2.10 we can establish the following two corollaries.
Corollary 3.2 The liberal rule is the only social rule that satisfies the meet separability,
self-duality, and anonymity axioms.
Corollary 3.3 The liberal rule is the only social rule that satisfies the join separability,
self-duality, and anonymity axioms.
If we replace the anonymity axiom with the symmetry axiom, however, this result no
longer holds. Consider the rule in which, for every j ∈ N and every issue b ∈ B, fj(P, b) =
P11. This is a one-vote rule and clearly satisfies the join separability, meet separability,
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and non-degeneracy axioms. Furthermore, it trivially satisfies the symmetry axiom, as
for all i, j ∈ N , fi(P, b) = fj(P, b). But this is not the liberal rule. To characterize
the liberal rule using the symmetry axiom we need an additional axiom, which we term
subgroup non-degeneracy. The subgroup non-degeneracy axiom requires that for
every potential subgroup of the larger population there is a profile such the members of
that subgroup, and only the members of that subgroup, are qualified.
Axiom 9 Subgroup non-degeneracy: For all S ⊂ N and all b ∈ B, there exists a profile
P such that {j : fj(P, b) = 1} = S.
Subgroup non-degeneracy implies non-degeneracy, as we show in the following lemma.
Lemma 3.4 If a social rule f satisfies the subgroup non-degeneracy axiom then it sat-
isfies the non-degeneracy axiom.
The symmetry and subgroup non-degeneracy axioms provide us with a separate char-
acterization of the liberal rule.
Theorem 3.5 The liberal rule is the only social rule that satisfies the meet separability,
join separability, subgroup non-degeneracy, and symmetry axioms.
Proof : That the liberal rule satisfies the axioms is trivial. We show that any rule that
satisfies the four axioms is necessarily the liberal rule. Let f satisfy the meet separability,
join separability, subgroup non-degeneracy, and symmetry axioms. Because f satisfies
the subgroup non-degeneracy axiom it must satisfy the non-degeneracy axiom by Lemma
3.4. Let j ∈ N and b ∈ B. By Theorem 2.5, all rules which satisfy the meet separability,
join separability, and non-degeneracy axioms are one-vote rules. Therefore fj(P, b) = Pik
for some pair (i, k) ∈ N ×N .
The subgroup non-degeneracy axiom implies there must be a different such pair for
every individual. To show this, assume that a one-vote rule satisfies the subgroup non-
degeneracy axiom but that there are two individuals whose qualification depends on the
same vote. Then there exists g ∈ N \ {j} such that fg(P, b) = Pik. This implies that
fj(P, b) = fg(P, b) for all profiles P . Because {j} ⊂ N , the subgroup non-degeneracy
axiom implies that there is some profile P such that fj(P, b) = 1 and fg(P, b) = 0. This
contradiction proves that the subgroup non-degeneracy axiom implies that for each j ∈ N
there exists a distinct pair of individuals (i, k) ∈ N ×N such that fj(P, b) = Pik.
Let P ′ be the n × n matrix such that all elements of this matrix are zero except
that P ′ik = P
′
jk = 1. Because i and j satisfy the conditions of the symmetry axiom,
fi(P
′, b) = fj(P ′, b). Because fj(P, b) = Pik, it follows that fj(P ′, b) = P ′ik = 1. This
implies that fi(P
′, b) = 1 and therefore that fi(P, b) = Pjk. From this we learn that:
for all i, j, k ∈ N, fj(P, b) = Pik if and only if fi(P, b) = Pjk. (1)
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From statement (1) it follows that fj(P, b) = Pik if and only if fk(P, b) = Pij if and only
if fi(P, b) = Pkj if and only if fj(P, b) = Pki if and only if fk(P, b) = Pji. Therefore
i = j = k. It follows that fj(P, b) = Pjj. By Theorem 2.1 it follows that fj(P, b) = Pjj
for all b ∈ B.
From Propositions 2.10 and 2.11 we can establish the following two corollaries.
Corollary 3.6 The liberal rule is the only social rule that satisfies the meet separability,
self-duality, subgroup non-degeneracy and symmetry axioms.
Corollary 3.7 The liberal rule is the only social rule that satisfies the join separability,
self-duality, subgroup non-degeneracy and symmetry axioms.
3.2 The Generalized Model
This paper has focused on the question of group identification, in which the binary
opinions of n persons on n issues are simultaneously aggregated.14 Alternatively, we
might consider a more general model involving the simultaneous aggregation of the binary
opinions of n persons on m issues, where n 6= m. All of the results in section 2 are
applicable to the more general case of simultaneous aggregation of binary opinions on
multiple issues. We provide here a simple example of how the results might be applied in
the case in which the set of issues is distinct from the set of individuals whose opinions
are considered.
Consider an economics department which needs to decide which of several potential
visitors should be invited to give a seminar. The chair of the department can choose to
hold one-vote in which all of the invitees for the semester will be chosen. Alternatively,
the chair can separate this decision into several votes: one in which the invitees for
the microeconomics seminars are chosen, one for the econometrics seminars, one for the
political economy seminars, and so on. Fearful that the chair will manipulate the result,
the faculty wish to choose a voting rule under which the ultimate list of invited seminars
is irrespective of how the chair separates the votes.
The requirement that the chair must not be able to manipulate the result is equiv-
alent to the requirement that the voting rule must satisfy the join separability axiom.
Presumably the faculty also wish to choose a rule that is non-degenerate – otherwise they
would not bother to vote.
From Theorem 2.4, it follows that the faculty must use a nomination rule to select
the invitees – for each potential visitor there must be a group of faculty such that the
support of one member of that group is necessary and sufficient for the visitor to be
invited. The composition of this group must be exogenously determined. We could
14Each of the n issues is the issue of whether a particular individual is a member of the group. These
issues are distinct from the set B of issues pertaining to specific groups.
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envision a rule under which any member of the faculty, or of the senior faculty, is able
to invite a seminar speaker. Or we could have a rule under which econometricians invite
econometricians, political economists invite political economists, and microeconomists
can invite microeconomists.
3.3 Weakening of the Axioms
The meet separability and join separability axioms are both formulated with respect to
every pair of issues {a, b} ⊂ B. It is possible to weaken these axioms by having them
apply only to pairs of issues in a subset of B. For example, we might want a rule to
aggregate opinions about British, Americans, and British-Americans consistently but not
care about how the rule aggregates opinions about people who are either British and/or
American. As a result we could choose a subset of B such that the axioms only place
restrictions on relationships between those issues in which we are interested.
With respect to these issues, the results of Theorems 2.1, 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5 would be
entirely the same if the weakened forms of the axioms were used. The only difference
would be with respect to the issues in which we are not interested. Proposition 2.10
would hold with respect to the issues in which we are interested, as well.
4 Appendix
4.1 Independence of the Axioms
We make seven claims about the independence of the axioms used in this paper.
Claim 1 The meet separability, join separability, non-degeneracy, and anonymity axioms
are independent.
Claim 2 The meet separability, join separability, subgroup non-degeneracy, and anonymity
axioms are independent.
Claim 3 The meet separability, join separability, subgroup non-degeneracy, and symme-
try axioms are independent.
Proof : We present four rules. The first rule satisfies all of the above axioms except for
meet separability. The second rule satisfies all of the above axioms except for join sepa-
rability. The third rule satisfies all of the above axioms except for non-degeneracy and
subgroup non-degeneracy. The fourth rule satisfies all of the above axioms except for
symmetry and anonymity. This is sufficient to prove all three claims.
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Rule 1: Consider the social rule f in which, for every j ∈ N and b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = 1
if and only if Pij = 1 for some i ∈ N . This is a nomination rule and therefore satisfies
join separability and non-degeneracy (by Theorem 2.4).
To show that it satisfies subgroup non-degeneracy, let S ⊂ N and let P S ∈ {0, 1}N×N
such that P Sij = 1 if and only if j ∈ S. Then {j : fj(P S, b) = 1} = S.
To show that it satisfies anonymity, consider an arbitrary j ∈ N and let pi be a
permutation of N . According to this rule, fj(P, b) = 1 if and only if there exists an
i ∈ N such that Pij = 1. Then fj(piP ) = 1 if and only if there exists an i ∈ N such that
(piP )ij = Ppi(i)pi(j) = 1. Because this is true for any i ∈ N , fj(piP, b) = 1 if and only if
there exists an i ∈ N such that Pipi(j) = 1. Furthermore, pifj(P, b) = fpi(j)(P, b) = 1 if
and only if there exists an i ∈ N such that Pipi(j) = 1. Therefore, pifj(P, b) = fj(piP ).
Because this is true for an arbitrary j ∈ N it follows that pif(P, b) = f(piP ).
To show that this rule satisfies symmetry, assume that there exist j, k ∈ N such that
(a) Pjj = Pkk, (b) Pkj = Pjk, and, for all i ∈ N \ {j, k}, (c) Pij = Pik, and (d) Pji = Pki.
Conditions (a), (b), and (c) imply that |{i ∈ N : Pij = 1}| = |{i ∈ N : Pik = 1}|, and
therefore fj(P, b) = fk(P, b).
Lastly, to show that the rule does not satisfy the meet separability axiom, let P ∈
{0, 1}N×N such that, for all j ∈ N , Pij = 1 if and only if i = 1, and let Q ∈
{0, 1}N×N such that, for all j ∈ N , Qij = 1 if and only if i = 2. Then, for all j ∈ N ,
fj(P, b) = fj(Q, b) = fj(P, b) ∧ fj(Q, b) = 1 but fj(P ∧ Q, b) = fj(0, b) = 0. Therefore
f(P ∧Q, b) 6= f(P, b) ∧ f(Q, b). Because f satisfies non-degeneracy it follows from The-
orem 2.1 that it fails meet separability.
Rule 2: Consider the social rule f in which, for every j ∈ N and b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = 1
if and only if Pij = 1 for all i ∈ N . This is an agreement rule and therefore satisfies meet
separability and non-degeneracy (by Theorem 2.3).
To show that it satisfies subgroup non-degeneracy, let S ⊂ N and let P S ∈ {0, 1}N×N
such that P Sij = 1 if and only if j ∈ S. Then {j : fj(P S, b) = 1} = S.
To show that it satisfies anonymity, consider an arbitrary j ∈ N and let pi be a
permutation of N . According to this rule, fj(P, b) = 1 if and only if Pij = 1 for all i ∈ N .
Then fj(piP, b) = 1 if and only if (piP )ij = Ppi(i)pi(j) = 1 for all i ∈ N . Because this must
be true for all i ∈ N , fj(piP, b) = 1 if and only if Pipi(j) = 1 for all i ∈ N . Furthermore,
pifj(P, b) = fpi(j)(P, b) = 1 if and only if Pipi(j) = 1 for all i ∈ N . Therefore, pifj(P, b) =
fj(piP ). Because this is true for an arbitrary j ∈ N it follows that pif(P, b) = f(piP ).
To show that this rule satisfies symmetry, assume that there exist j, k ∈ N such that
(a) Pjj = Pkk, (b) Pkj = Pjk, and, for all i ∈ N \ {j, k}, (c) Pij = Pik, and (d) Pji = Pki.
Conditions (a), (b), and (c) imply that |{i ∈ N : Pij = 1}| = |{i ∈ N : Pik = 1}|, and
therefore fj(P, b) = fk(P, b).
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Lastly, to show that the rule does not satisfy the join separability axiom, let P ∈
{0, 1}N×N such that, for all j ∈ N , Pij = 1 if and only if i = 1, and let Q ∈
{0, 1}N×N such that, for all j ∈ N , Qij = 1 if and only if i 6= 1. Then, for all j ∈ N ,
fj(P, b) = fj(Q, b) = fj(P, b) ∨ fj(Q, b) = 0 but fj(P ∨ Q, b) = fj(1) = 1. Therefore
f(P ∨Q, b) 6= f(P, b) ∨ f(Q, b). Because f satisfies non-degeneracy it follows from The-
orem 2.1 that it fails join separability.
Rule 3: Consider the degenerate social rule f in which fj(P, b) = 1 for every j ∈ N ,
b ∈ B, and all profiles P ∈ {0, 1}N×N . This trivially satisfies the meet separability, join
separability, anonymity, and symmetry axioms, but violates non-degeneracy and sub-
group non-degeneracy.
Rule 4: Consider the social rule f in which, for every j ∈ N and b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = 1 if
and only if P1j = 1. This is a one-vote rule and therefore satisfies the meet separability,
join separability, and non-degeneracy axioms (by Theorem 2.5). To show that it satisfies
subgroup non-degeneracy, let S ⊂ N and let P S ∈ {0, 1}N×N such that P Sij = 1 if and
only if j ∈ S. Then {j : fj(P S, b) = 1} = S. However, f is not the liberal rule and
therefore clearly violates the anonymity and symmetry axioms (by Theorems 3.1 and
3.5).
Claim 4 The meet separability, self-duality, and anonymity axioms are independent.
Claim 5 The meet separability, self-duality, subgroup non-degeneracy, and symmetry
axioms are independent.
Proof : We present four rules. The first rule satisfies all of the above axioms except for
meet separability. The second rule satisfies all of the above axioms except for self-duality.
The third rule satisfies meet separability, self-duality, and symmetry, but does not satisfy
subgroup non-degeneracy. The fourth rule satisfies all of the above axioms except for
symmetry and anonymity. This is sufficient to prove both claims.
Rule 1: Consider the rule in which, for every j ∈ N and b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = Pjj if
and only if there exists an i ∈ N , i 6= j, such that Pjj = Pij. To show that this rule
satisfies self-duality, there are two cases. First, suppose there exists an i ∈ N , i 6= j, such
that Pjj = Pij. Then there is an i ∈ N , i 6= j, such that P¯jj = P¯ij. This implies that
fj(P, b) = Pjj and fj(P¯ , b) = P¯jj, which implies that f¯j(P, b) = fj(P¯ , b) = P¯ jj = Pjj.
Therefore f¯j(P, b) = fj(P, b). Next, suppose that there does not exist an i ∈ N , i 6= j,
such that Pjj = Pij. Then there does not exist an i ∈ N , i 6= j, such that P¯jj = P¯ij. This
implies that fj(P, b) = P¯jj and fj(P¯ , b) = Pjj, which implies that f¯j(P, b) = fj(P¯ , b) =
P¯jj. Therefore f j(P, b) = fj(P, b).
To show that it satisfies subgroup non-degeneracy, let S ⊂ N and let P S ∈ {0, 1}N×N
such that P Sij = 1 if and only if j ∈ S. Then {j : fj(P S, b) = 1} = S.
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To show that this rule satisfies the anonymity axiom, consider an arbitrary j ∈ N
and let pi be a permutation of N . According to this rule, fj(P, b) = Pjj if and only
if there exists an i ∈ N , i 6= j, such that Pjj = Pij. Then fj(piP, b) = (piP )jj if
and only if there exists an i ∈ N , i 6= j, such that Ppi(j)pi(j) = Ppi(i)pi(j). Furthermore,
pifj(P, b) = fpi(j)(P, b) = Ppi(j)pi(j) if and only if there exists an pi(i) ∈ N , pi(i) 6= pi(j),
such that Ppi(j)pi(j) = Ppi(i)pi(j). Therefore, pifj(P, b) = fj(piP ). Because this is true for an
arbitrary j ∈ N it follows that pif(P, b) = f(piP ).
To show that this rule satisfies symmetry, assume that there exist j, k ∈ N such that
(a) Pjj = Pkk, (b) Pkj = Pjk, and, for all i ∈ N \ {j, k}, (c) Pij = Pik, and (d) Pji = Pki.
Conditions (b) and (c) imply that |{i ∈ N \ {j} : Pij = 1}| = |{i ∈ N \ {k} : Pik = 1}|.
From this and from condition (a) it follows that fj(P, b) = fk(P, b).
Lastly, to show that the rule does not satisfy the meet separability axiom, let P ∈
{0, 1}N×N such that, for all j ∈ N , Pij = 1 if and only if i = j or i = j − 1, and let
Q ∈ {0, 1}N×N such that, for all j ∈ N , Qij = 1 if and only if i = j or i = j + 1.
Then f2(P, b) = f2(Q, b) = f2(P, b) ∧ f2(Q, b) = 1 and f2(P ∧ Q, b) = 0. Therefore
f(P ∧ Q, b) 6= f(P, b) ∧ f(Q, b). Because f satisfies self-duality (and therefore non-
degeneracy) it follows from Theorem 2.1 that it fails meet separability.
Rule 2: Consider the rule in which, for all j ∈ N and b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = 1 if and only if
Pij = 1 for all i ∈ N . This is an agreement rule and therefore satisfies meet separability
(by Theorem 2.1).
To show that it satisfies subgroup non-degeneracy, let S ⊂ N and let P S ∈ {0, 1}N×N
such that P Sij = 1 if and only if j ∈ S. Then {j : fj(P S, b) = 1} = S.
To show that it satisfies anonymity, consider an arbitrary j ∈ N and let pi be a
permutation of N . According to this rule, fj(P, b) = 1 if and only if Pij = 1 for all i ∈ N .
Then fj(piP, b) = 1 if and only if (piP )ij = Ppi(i)pi(j) = 1 for all i ∈ N . Because this must
be true for all i ∈ N , fj(piP, b) = 1 if and only if Pipi(j) = 1 for all i ∈ N . Furthermore,
pifj(P, b) = fpi(j)(P, b) = 1 if and only if Pipi(j) = 1 for all i ∈ N . Therefore, pifj(P, b) =
fj(piP, b). Because this is true for an arbitrary j ∈ N it follows that pif(P, b) = f(piP, b).
To show that this rule satisfies symmetry, assume that there exist j, k ∈ N such that
(a) Pjj = Pkk, (b) Pkj = Pjk, and, for all i ∈ N \ {j, k}, (c) Pij = Pik, and (d) Pji = Pki.
Conditions (a), (b), and (c) imply that |{i ∈ N : Pij = 1}| = |{i ∈ N : Pik = 1}|, and
therefore fj(P, b) = fk(P, b).
Lastly, to show that this rule does not satisfy self-duality, construct a profile P ′ such
that P ′ij = 1 if and only if i = 1. Then for all j ∈ N , fj(P ′, b) = 0 and fj(P¯ ′, b) = 0. This
implies that fj(P¯ ′, b) = f¯j(P ′, b) = 1. Because f¯j(P ′, b) 6= fj(P ′, b), f is not self-dual.
Rule 3: Consider the rule in which, for all j ∈ N and b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = 1 if and
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only if P11 = 1. This rule is a one-vote rule and therefore satisfies the meet separability
and self-duality axioms. Furthermore it satisfies symmetry as for all i, j ∈ N and all
P ∈ {0, 1}N×N , fi(P, b) = fj(P, b). However it does not satisfy subgroup non-degeneracy
as for all S ⊂ N , S 6= N , S 6= ∅, there is no profile P such that {j : fj(P, b) = 1} = S.
Rule 4: Consider the social rule f in which, for all j ∈ N and b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = 1 if
and only if P1j = 1. This is a one-vote rule and therefore satisfies the meet separability
and self-duality axioms. To show that it satisfies subgroup non-degeneracy, let S ⊂ N
and let P S ∈ {0, 1}N×N such that P Sij = 1 if and only if j ∈ S. Then {j : fj(P S, b) =
1} = S. However, f is not the liberal rule and therefore clearly violates the anonymity
and symmetry axioms (by Corollaries 3.2 and 3.6).
Claim 6 The join separability, self-duality, and anonymity axioms are independent.
Claim 7 The join separability, self-duality, subgroup non-degeneracy, and symmetry ax-
ioms are independent.
Proof : We present four rules. The first rule satisfies all of the above axioms except for
join separability. The second rule satisfies all of the above axioms except for self-duality.
The third rule satisfies join separability, self-duality, and symmetry, but does not satisfy
subgroup non-degeneracy. The fourth rule satisfies all of the above axioms except for
symmetry and anonymity. This is sufficient to prove both claims.
Rule 1: Consider the rule in which, for every j ∈ N and b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = Pjj if
and only if there exists an i ∈ N , i 6= j, such that Pjj = Pij. To show that this rule
satisfies self-duality, there are two cases. First, suppose there exists an i ∈ N , i 6= j, such
that Pjj = Pij. Then there is an i ∈ N , i 6= j, such that P¯jj = P¯ij. This implies that
fj(P, b) = Pjj and fj(P¯ , b) = P¯jj, which implies that f¯j(P, b) = fj(P¯ , b) = P¯ jj = Pjj.
Therefore f¯j(P, b) = fj(P, b). Next, suppose that there does not exist an i ∈ N , i 6= j,
such that Pjj = Pij. Then there does not exist an i ∈ N , i 6= j, such that P¯jj = P¯ij. This
implies that fj(P, b) = P¯jj and fj(P¯ , b) = Pjj, which implies that f¯j(P, b) = fj(P¯ , b) =
P¯jj. Therefore f j(P, b) = fj(P, b).
To show that it satisfies subgroup non-degeneracy, let S ⊂ N and let P S ∈ {0, 1}N×N
such that P Sij = 1 if and only if j ∈ S. Then {j : fj(P S, b) = 1} = S.
To show that this rule satisfies the anonymity axiom, consider an arbitrary j ∈ N
and let pi be a permutation of N . According to this rule, fj(P, b) = Pjj if and only
if there exists an i ∈ N , i 6= j, such that Pjj = Pij. Then fj(piP, b) = (piP )jj if
and only if there exists an i ∈ N , i 6= j, such that Ppi(j)pi(j) = Ppi(i)pi(j). Furthermore,
pifj(P, b) = fpi(j)(P, b) = Ppi(j)pi(j) if and only if there exists an pi(i) ∈ N , pi(i) 6= pi(j),
such that Ppi(j)pi(j) = Ppi(i)pi(j). Therefore, pifj(P, b) = fj(piP ). Because this is true for an
arbitrary j ∈ N it follows that pif(P, b) = f(piP ).
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To show that this rule satisfies symmetry, assume that there exist j, k ∈ N such that
(a) Pjj = Pkk, (b) Pkj = Pjk, and, for all i ∈ N \ {j, k}, (c) Pij = Pik, and (d) Pji = Pki.
Conditions (b) and (c) imply that |{i ∈ N \ {j} : Pij = 1}| = |{i ∈ N \ {k} : Pik = 1}|.
From this and from condition (a) it follows that fj(P, b) = fk(P, b).
Lastly, to show that the rule does not satisfy the join separability axiom, let P ∈
{0, 1}N×N such that, for all j ∈ N , Pij = 1 if and only if i = j, and let Q ∈ {0, 1}N×N
such that, for all j ∈ N , Qij = 1 if and only if i = j + 1. Then f2(P, b) = f2(Q, b) =
f2(P, b) ∨ f2(Q, b) = 0 but f2(P ∨ Q, b) = 1. Therefore f(P ∨ Q, b) 6= f(P, b) ∨ f(Q, b).
Because f satisfies self-duality (and therefore non-degeneracy) it follows from Theorem
2.1 that it fails join separability.
Rule 2: Consider the rule in which, for every j ∈ N and b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = 1 if and
only if Pij = 1 for some i ∈ N . This is a nomination rule and therefore satisfies join
separability (by Theorem 2.1).
To show that it satisfies subgroup non-degeneracy, let S ⊂ N and let P S ∈ {0, 1}N×N
such that P Sij = 1 if and only if j ∈ S. Then {j : fj(P S, b) = 1} = S.
To show that it satisfies anonymity, consider an arbitrary j ∈ N and let pi be a
permutation of N . According to this rule, fj(P, b) = 1 if and only if there exists an
i ∈ N such that Pij = 1. Then fj(piP, b) = 1 if and only if there exists an i ∈ N such
that (piP )ij = Ppi(i)pi(j) = 1. Because this is true for any i ∈ N , fj(piP, b) = 1 if and only
if there exists an i ∈ N such that Pipi(j) = 1. Furthermore, pifj(P, b) = fpi(j)(P, b) = 1 if
and only if there exists an i ∈ N such that Pipi(j) = 1. Therefore, pifj(P, b) = fj(piP, b).
Because this is true for an arbitrary j ∈ N it follows that pif(P, b) = f(piP, b).
To show that this rule satisfies symmetry, assume that there exist j, k ∈ N such that
(a) Pjj = Pkk, (b) Pkj = Pjk, and, for all i ∈ N \ {j, k}, (c) Pij = Pik, and (d) Pji = Pki.
Conditions (a), (b), and (c) imply that |{i ∈ N : Pij = 1}| = |{i ∈ N : Pik = 1}|, and
therefore fj(P, b) = fk(P, b).
Lastly, to show that this rule does not satisfy self-duality, construct a profile P ′ such
that P ′ij = 1 if and only if i = 1. Then for all j ∈ N , fj(P ′, b) = 1 and fj(P¯ ′, b) = 1. This
implies that fj(P¯ ′, b) = f¯j(P ′, b) = 0. Because f¯j(P ′, b) 6= fj(P ′, b), f is not self-dual.
Rule 3: Consider the rule in which, for all j ∈ N and b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = 1 if and
only if P11 = 1. This rule is a one-vote rule and therefore satisfies the join separability
and self-duality axioms. Furthermore it satisfies symmetry as for all i, j ∈ N and all
P ∈ {0, 1}N×N , fi(P, b) = fj(P, b). However it does not satisfy subgroup non-degeneracy
as for all S ⊂ N , S 6= N , S 6= ∅, there is no profile P such that {j : fj(P, b) = 1} = S.
Rule 4: Consider the social rule f in which, for all j ∈ N and b ∈ B, fj(P, b) = 1 if
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and only if P1j = 1. This is a one-vote rule and therefore satisfies the join separability
and self-duality axioms. To show that it satisfies subgroup non-degeneracy, let S ⊂ N
and let P S ∈ {0, 1}N×N such that P Sij = 1 if and only if j ∈ S. Then {j : fj(P S, b) =
1} = S. However, f is not the liberal rule and therefore clearly violates the anonymity
and symmetry axioms (by Corollaries 3.3 and 3.7).
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